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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
APPELLANT IS INCARCERATED
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
LEVI WICKWARD,

Criminal No. 101500382
Appellate Case No. 20100950
Judge: G. Michael Westfall

Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTION
This appeal comes under the jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated, §78A-4-103 (l)(2)(e) (1953, as amended) in that it involves an appeal from a
court of record in a criminal case which does not involve a conviction of a capital or first degree
felony.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL
Issues that were considered for appeal in this case by Counsel for Appellant include the
following:
ISSUE No. 1: Whether or not the Appellant received ineffective assistance of counsel or
if there was prosecutorial misconduct under the circumstances?
ISSUE No. 2: Whether or not Appellant may challenge the plea agreement when he did
not give notice or file a motion to withdraw his plea prior to sentencing?
ISSUE No. 3: Whether or not the trial court erred or abused its discretion in sentencing
the Appellant to prison under the circumstances of this case?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review is believed to be one of "correctness" as it applies to questions of law and
1

the interpretation of statute. It is a standard of "clearly erroneous" as it applies to questions of
fact. See State v. Ramirez, 1817 P.2d 774 and State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048 (Utah App 1991);
see also State v. Gibbons, 770 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1989) and State v. Gerrard, 574 P.2d 885 (Utah
1978). The trial court abuses its discretion if it acts unreasonably. See State v. Commer, 2002 UT
App. 219 at 111, 51 P.3d 55 (quoting State v. Whittel 1999 UT 96, at paragraph 20, 989 P.2d 52)
cert, denied, 59 P.3d 603 (Utah 2002). The Court of Appeals accords no deference to the legal
conclusions of the trial court but reviews them for correctness. State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, at 18,
20 P.3d 300.
Sentencing, being indeterminate in the State of Utah, falls to the substantial discretion of
the trial court judge. See State v. Smith, 842 P.2d 908 (Utah 1992). Moreover, the exercise of
that discretion is not unlimited and it may not be exercised on the basis of unreliable information.
See State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115 (Utah 1985). It is an abuse of discretion to deny a motion to
withdraw plea if the Appellant did not have full knowledge and understanding of the
circumstances of his plea. See State v. Valsilacupulos, 756 P.2d 92 (Utah App) cert, denied, 765
P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988).
Regarding a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court reviews for correctness
the trial court's application of law to the facts. Id. It defers to the trial court's factual
determination unless clearly erroneous but remains free to make an independent determination of
a trial court's legal conclusions. See State v. Hales, 2007 UT 14 at f 37. The right to counsel
embodied in the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution is a right to the effective
assistance of counsel. A defendant is deprived of this right when his counsel's conduct so
undermines the proper function of the adversarial process that the proceedings cannot be relied
on in having produced a just result. Ineffective assistance of counsel is proven when performance
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is so deficient as to fall below an objective standard of reasonableness and except for such
deficient performance there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have
been different Id at ^[68; see also Stickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The statutory provisions which Appellant believes to be applicable but not decisive are as
follows:
Utah Code Annotated §41-6a-517, §58-37-8 and §78A-4-103 (1953, as amended), true and
correct photocopies of the statutory provisions are attached hereto, marked as Appellant's Exhibit
"A" and the same is incorporated herein by this reference as part of the addendum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE of the CASE: This case concerns the Appellant, LEVI WICKWARD, who was
pulled over in Iron County on or about the 29th day of June, 2010, for driving a vehicle travelling
ten miles an hour above the speed limit. The officer approached the vehicle and the Appellant
appeared to him to be nervous and would not keep his hands where the officer could see them
after being asked several times to do so. He and his female passenger were then asked to exit the
vehicle for the officer's safety and each consented to a search of it.
The officer found aluminum foil, a pen that the middle had been removed, a plastic straw
that was burnt at one end and a box containing a prescription medication bottle with no label.
The bottle was found to contain Azepam and Oxycodone Hydrochloride. The passenger
thereafter informed officers that the Appellant was planning on selling the medication to some
friends in Cedar City, Utah. Several text messages from the phone of the Appellant confirmed
this.
Appellant also consented to testing which returned positive for THC. He was arrested and
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charged with two counts of possession of a controlled substance with an intent to distribute, one
as a second degree felony and the other a class A misdemeanor; possession of drug paraphernalia
and driving with a measurable controlled substance in the body, each a class B misdemeanor. He
had a prior conviction for burglary of a dwelling in 2009 in Washington County. He was
appointed a public defender and a preliminary hearing was held on or about the 21 st day of July,
2010, where he was bound over on all counts. He was arraigned on the 3 rd day of August, 2010,
pleading not guilty and the matter was set for a one-day jury trial on the 28th day of October,
2010. While incarcerated, on or about the 8th day of July, 2010, the Appellant was also charged
with a third degree felony for damaging the Iron County jail in criminal case number 101500414.
On or about the 1st day of September, 2010, the matter came before Court for a change of
plea and the Appellant signed a Statement of Defendant in Support of Guilty
Plea and Certificate of Counsel and Order, pleading guilty to possession of a controlled substance
with intent to distribute, a second degree felony and driving with a measurable controlled
substance in the body, a class B misdemeanor. The remaining charges were dismissed, including
those in criminal case number 101500414. This document provided notice of withdrawing his
plea within thirty (30) days.
The arrangement contemplated the recommendation of a presentence investigation report
and the matter was continued for sentencing to allow for its preparation. On or about the 25th day
of October, 2010, the Court filed its judgment, sentence and commitment after having sentenced
the Appellant on the 5 day of October, 2010, consistent with the recommendation made by
Adult Probation & Parole to Utah State Prison, to pay a fine in the amount of $1,000.00 and a
court security fee of $33.00 for each count to which he pled guilty. The sentences were run
concurrent and it was recommended to the Board of Pardons to give the Appellant credit for 99
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days for time served in the Iron County Jail. No notice or motion to withdraw the Appellant's
plea was filed with the court or asserted at sentencing or thereafter.
A notice of appeal was filed on or about the 23rd day of November, 2010, his appointed
attorney ait trial thereafter withdrawing and indicating that he had notified Appellant of his right
to motion for a new trial or to seek a certificate of probable cause and that he has a right to appeal
his case. There was not filed a motion to withdraw plea prior to sentencing or at anytime
thereafter and the notice of appeal is not specific as to grounds for filing the same.
COURSE of PROCEEDINGS and DISPOSITION: Appellant was arrested on the 29th day
of June, 2010, when he was charged with two counts of possession of a controlled substance with
intent to distribute, a second degree felony for possession of Oxycodone Hydrochloride and a
class A misdemeanor for possessing Azepam. He was charged with possession of drug
paraphernalia for having certain items thought to be used in connection with drug use and driving
with a measurable controlled substance in the body for testing positive for THC, each a class B
misdemeanor. While incarcerated on or about the 8th day of July, 2008, he was charged with a
third degree felony for damaging the Iron Count Jail. He had a prior conviction for burglary of a
dwelling in 2009 in Washington County, State of Utah. He was appointed a public defender and
a preliminairy hearing was held on or about the 21 st day of July, 2010, where he was bound over
on all counts and entered a not guilty plea on or about the 3 rd day of August, 2010. The matter
was set for a one-day jury trial for the end of October.
He appeared before the Court on the 1st day of September, 2010, and signed a statement
of defendant in support of guilty plea and certificate of counsel and order, pleading guilty to
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, a second degree felony and driving
with a measurable controlled substance in the body, a class B misdemeanor. The remaining
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charges were dismissed. He was sentenced on the 5 day of October, 2010, and the judgment,
sentence and commitment filed on or about the 25th day of October, 2010, the trial court having
followed the recommendation made by Adult Probation and Parole, fining the Appellant
$1,000.00 with a security fee of $33.00 for each count pled to, running the sentences concurrent
and recommending credit for time served. Appellant is presently incarcerated. A Notice of
Appeal was filed on the 23rd day of November, 2010, new counsel appointed for appeal and
Appellant was advised of his rights to motion for a new trial or to seek a certificate of probable
cause to appeal his case. No notice or motion to withdraw plea was made and notice of appeal
was not specific as to grounds for filing the same.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. On or about the 29 day of June, 2010, Michael Iverson of the Iron County Sheriffs
Office observed a silver passenger vehicle travelling at a high rate of speed. The Officer
conducted a stop of the vehicle and had the Appellant and his passenger exit as he felt
uncomfortable about their nervous behavior. The passenger was the registered owner of the
vehicle and she consented to search. See the preliminary hearing transcript at page 5, in the
record at 6 and 7, a true and correct photocopy is attached as Appellant's Exhibit "B" of the
Addendum and incorporated herein by this reference.
2. A search of the vehicle turned up prescription medication which was not in a proper
prescription bottle or under proper label. Id at page 7. The passenger indicated that she had only
met Appellant two days prior and had overheard conversations as his talked on his cell phone
where she believed he was arranging the sale or exchange of drugs. The Appellant had offered
her a blue roxy pill which she reluctantly decided to take after first declining due to her own
prescription medication addiction. See the record at 1 and 2.
6

3. The search also recovered several items that were suspicious to the searching officers.
They found aluminum foil, a pen that the middle had been removed, a plastic straw that was
burnt at one end and as mentioned a box containing a prescription medication bottle with no
label. It was determined afterward that the bottle contained Oxycodone Hydrochloride and
Azepam. See preliminary hearing transcript at page 7. Appellant consented to drug testing which
returned positive for THC. Id at page 11.
4. Appellant was arrested and charged with two counts of possession of a controlled
substance with intent to distribute, one a second degree felony and the other a class A
misdemeanor; possession of drug paraphernalia and driving with a metabolite controlled
substance in the body, each a class B misdemeanor. See the record at 4 to 7.He had a prior
conviction for burglary of a dwelling in 2009 in Washington County. See the preliminary hearing
transcript at page 32, in the record at 67.
5. The Appellant was appointed a public defender and a preliminary hearing was held on
or about the 21 st day of July, 2010, he was bound over on all counts. He was arraigned on the 3rd
day of August, 2010, pleading not guilty and the matter was set for a one-day jury trial for the
28th day of October, 2010. See the record at 21. While incarcerated on or about the 8th day of
July, 2010., the Appellant was also charged with a third degree felony for damaging the Iron
County Jail in criminal case number, 101500414.
6. On or about the 1st day of September, 2010, the matter came before the trial court in a
change of plea and the Appellant signed a defendant in support of guilty plea and certificate of
counsel and order, pleading guilty to possession of a controlled substance with intent to
distribute, a second degree felony and driving with a measurable controlled substance in the
body, a class B misdemeanor. See the record at 27 to 36, a true and correct photocopy of the plea
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agreement is attached as Appellant's Exhibit "C" of the Addendum and incorporated herein by
this reference. The remaining charges were dismissed, including those in criminal case number
101500414. The plea agreement advised the Appellant of his rights and those that would be
waived and to file written notice to withdraw his plea within thirty (30) days. A presentence
investigation report was ordered and the matter was continue for sentencing.
5. The Appellant was sentenced on the 5 day of October, 2010, the trial court judge
having received and reviewed the presentence investigation report which recommended that
Appellant be sentenced to prison per statute, one to fifteen years for the second degree felony and
six months for the class B misdemeanor. The Court followed the recommendation, and ran the
sentences concurrently, charging a $33.00 court security fee for each count and recommending
that the Appellant receive credit for 99 days served in the Iron County Jail. See the sentencing
hearing at pages 10-12, in the record at 68, a true and complete photocopy is attached as
Appellant's Exhibit "D" of the Addendum and is incorporated herein by this reference. He was
also ordered to pay a fine in the amount $1,000.00 including the ninety percent (90%) surcharge.
The trial court's judgment, sentence and commitment was filed on or about the 25th day of
October, 2010. See the record at 56-60, a true and complete photocopy is attached as Appellant's
Exhibit "E" of the Addendum and incorporated herein by this reference. The Notice of Appeal
was filed on or about the 23rd day of November, 2010, appointed attorney at trial thereafter
withdrawing and indicating that he had notified Appellant of his right to motion for a new trial or
to seek a certificate of probable cause and that he had a right to appeal his case. There was not
filed a motion to withdraw plea prior to sentencing or at anytime thereafter. Notice of Appeal
was not specific as to the grounds for filing the same.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Counsel for Appellant submits an Anders' brief, concluding that the appeal is nonmeritorious, finding that the record does not support a challenge to the procedure or findings of
the trial court judge accepting the plea or at sentencing. Moreover, the record does not support a
claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. Counsel for Appellant believes the prospect of
success on appeal unlikely in light of the fact that the record does not propose or show that
Appellant attempted to withdraw his plea in a timely fashion and that the trial court judge did not
abuse its discretion accepting it or following the recommendation of Adult Probation & Parole in
sentencing the Appellant.
ARGUMENT
A.
SUBMISSION OF ANDERS' BRIEF PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF
STATE V. WELLS, 2000 UTAH APP. 304,13 P.3D 1056
Counsel for Appellant files this brief after the manner of Anders v. California, 386 U.S.
7838, 87 S.Ct. 1397, 1811 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), having furnished to this Court the details which
counsel submits should be considered in the record that might arguably support an appeal.
Counsel submits that the certificate of mailing will confirm that a copy of this brief was
furnished to Appellant by mail after Appellant had the opportunity to discuss, review and provide
arguments or commentary. Counsel also submits the following considered points in reaching his
determination that the appeal of Appellant is non-meritorious.
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POINT NO. 1
THE APPEAL IS FROM THE SENTENCE OF THE APPELLANT AFTER
ENTRY OF A GUILTY PLEA PURSUANT TO A PLEA AGREEMENT WHICH LIMITS
THE POTENTIAL ISSUES THAT CAN BE RAISED ON APPEAL.
The circumstances of the present case are not unusual. In fact, one might consider them to
be a common, frequent and regular occurrence to have a Defendant enter into a plea agreement
with some hope or expectation of favorable disposition only to be sentenced to something less
expected and understanding his right to appeal chooses to exercise it by advising his attorney to
file on his behalf without much explanation. In this case, counsel for Appellant did not represent
him in the trial court proceedings. After sentencing, an appeal was filed at the request of
Appellant. However, there was never provided a specific basis and the record and transcript of
sentencing is devoid of any notice or motion to withdraw plea. There was prepared a statement of
defendant in support of guilty plea and certificate of counsel and order which notified the
Appellant of the issues, the crime and statutory provision, degree of the offense and possible
maximum punishment of each. Elements were provided as well as a factual basis sufficient to
support the charges to which Appellant was pleading. Sufficient explanation was offered in the
caption of "Waiver of Constitutional Rights" setting forth boldly that in pleading guilty he was
waiving and giving up all his statutory and constitutional rights explained therein. It was further
explained that he only had thirty days to withdraw his plea even though he actually had up until
sentencing. There was as a certificate of voluntariness wherein the Appellant initialed and
acknowledged that he was entering the plea voluntarily and of his own free will and choice
understanding it and satisfied with the advice and assistance of counsel, not under the influence of
any drugs, medication or intoxicants that would impair his judgment and not suffering from any
mental disability or incapacity.
10

In other words, the record in this case shows that the Appellant acknowledged that he
read and understood the statement of defendant regarding guilty plea and that it was his desire to
enter into the plea of guilty pursuant to the plea agreement which contemplated dismissal of the
other remaining charges and the preparation of a presentence report. Moreover, since the matter
did not go to trial, there is really nothing in the record that would establish or suggest ineffective
assistance of counsel or prosecutorial misconduct. Counsel's handling of the preliminary hearing
was responsible and appropriate. There was not filed pretrial motions. There was nothing unusual,
extraordinary or noteworthy about the procedure in which Appellant's case was handled to
distinguish it as being exceptional or different and particularly, the statement of defendant
regarding guilty plea or the review of the trial court judge addressing issues of voluntariness. In
other words, for purposes of review, the record reveals nothing that would suggest or establish a
meritorious claim for appeal primarily because the circumstances disclose that the case was
resolved early in the proceedings, prior to trial and a full and adequate record was made of the
entry of the plea and the execution of the that procedure rendered mute any pending issues
regarding the action taken by the bench or bar. In State of Utah v. Lopez, 2005 UT App 496, this
Court ruled that pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §77-13-6(2) anytime after a defendant has
entered a guilty plea but before a sentence is announced, a defendant may move to withdraw it.
This is also the position taken by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Ostler, 2001 UT 68 31 P.3d
528. Notwithstanding, it requires that a motion or notice be filed, raised or considered. Likewise,
the Utah Supreme Court has ordered that plea agreements are binding on the parties and the court
once the plea is entered and accepted. See State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294, 1304 (Utah 1986). In State
v. Ostler, 2000 UT App 28, this Court made clear the requirement to insure that constitutional and
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procedural requirements of Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure have been met. In this
case, it was accomplished through a written plea agreement which is part of the record a copy is
attached as Appellant's Exhibit "C" of the Addendum and incorporated herein by this reference.
Use of a written affidavit signed by the defendant was addressed as an efficient means to comply
with the strict requirements of Rule 11(e). See State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1313 (Utah
1987). The written plea agreement in this case meets this Court's requirements.
POINT NO. 2
REVIEW OF THE RECORD REVEALS NO BASIS FOR ASSERTING INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
Appointed counsel provided an appropriate defense. He properly conducted the
preliminary hearing and protected Appellant's rights at arraignment by pleading not guilty. The
Appellant by his written agreement acknowledged that he is satisfied with the advice and services
provided by his attorney as part of the plea. While no witnesses were called by the defense at
preliminary hearing, it is not common to call defense witnesses at that stage of the proceedings.
There were no pretrial motions filed or contemplated. To determine whether Appellant received
ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, it must be shown that the representation fell below the
objective standard of a reasonable professional, overcoming the presumption first that counsel
rendered adequate assistance and exercised reasonable professional judgment; and second,
showing that counsel's errors were prejudicial. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689,
104 s. ct. 2052, 2065, 80 L.ed. 2d. 674 (1984). Particularly, discrepancies in trial counsel's
performance must be obvious. In State v. Valdez, 2004 UT App 200, this Court noted that:
Appellant review of counsel's performance must be highly deferential, otherwise,
the distorting effects of hindsight would produce too great a temptation for courts to
12

second guess trial counsel's performance on the basis of an inanimate record (citations
omitted). Furthermore, we will not second guess trial counsels legitimate strategic
choices, however flawed those choices might appear in retrospect. Id at f3.
In this case, the matter resolved without a trial. Nothing can be gleaned from the record to
suggest counsel was ineffective or that there was misconduct on the part of the prosecution. More
importantly, the record fails to disclose prejudicial error or indicate that the result would have
more likely been successful had the course chosen by counsel been a different one. The court
reviews the matter in the context of considering if the challenged act or omission might be
considered sound trial strategy. See State v. Wallace, 2002 UT App 295, at %8. Certainly,
Appellant in this case obtained the benefit of having additional charges dismissed having the two
counts he plead to run concurrently with credit for time served. There is nothing in the record to
suggest that an alternative strategy would have been anymore sound or likely to be as successful.
Moreover, it is impossible in this case to establish prejudicial harm since none is demonstrated in
the record and given the fact that it has long been this Court's policy to not rely upon the general
or conclusory statements of the Appellant. See State v. Skidmore, 2002 UT App 51 at ^8. Where
the record is silent on such matters, this Court is not likely to speculate particularly in light of the
fact that there was no notice or motion made to withdraw Appellant's plea of guilty.
POINT NO. 3
SENTENCING IN THE CASE WAS REASONABLE AND WITHIN THE BROAD
DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL COURT TO RUN CONCURRENT AND RECOMMEND
CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED.
The trial court in this case sentenced pursuant to the recommendation made by Adult
Probation & Parole which was also consistent with the criminal history matrix. The trial court
judge has broad discretion in sentencing. See State v. Smith, 842 P.2d 908 (Utah 1992).
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However, a trial court judge abuses its discretion if the record reveals having exercised it on the
basis of unreliable information. See State v. Howell 707 P.2d 115 (Utah 1985). Nothing of this
sort is indicated in the record in this case. The sentencing did not exceed statutory or
constitutional limits and appears to have considered relevant factors. The overall sentence was
mitigated by running the two counts concurrent and recommending to the Board of Pardons that
Appellant be given credit for time served in the Iron County Jail. Therefore, it cannot be said that
the trial court judge abused his discretion in sentencing the Appellant. The judgment was within
his authority and the bounds of the charge and it does not appear to have been exercised on the
basis of unreliable information. Therefore, this attorney believes any claim to the contrary to be
non-meritorious.
CONCLUSION
On the grounds and for the reasons set forth above, counsel for Appellant, having
submitted this brief in the fashion of Anders9 as required by State v. Wells, 2000 Utah App. 304,
13 P.3d 1056, having exercised due diligence in attempting to support Appellant's appeal to the
best of his ability, having underwent a thorough examination of the record and transcripts in the
case and having set forth those points and authorities disclosing a basis which might arguably
support the appeal, having furnished the Appellant with a copy and provided him with an
opportunity to augment or change the same, and Appellant having chosen not to do so, this
attorney requests leave to withdraw, after the Court's review and determining that no additional
issues could have been raised or finding that Appellant had no desire to submit a brief on his
own. In other words, counsel for Appellant requests that action be taken by the Court of Appeals
to either dismiss the appeal or proceed to a decision on the merits together with such other and
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further relief as to it appears equitable and oroper
DATED this

'^20^f
J. |IRYAN JACKSON
Counsel for Appellant
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ADDENDUM

EXHIBIT A

Utah Code Annotated, Section 58-37-8 (1953, as amended).
Prohibited Acts - Penalties.
(1) Prohibited acts A - Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to knowingly and
intentionally:
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with* intent to produce, manufacture,
or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent, offer, or arrange
to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute; or
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where:
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct which results in any violation
of any provision of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d that is a felony; and
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more violations of Title 58,
Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on separate occasions that are undertaken in concert
with five or more persons with respect to whom the person occupies a position of
organizer, supervisor, or any other position of management.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to:
(i) a substance or a counterfeit of a substance classified in Schedule I or II, a controlled
substance analog, or gammahydroxybutyric acid as listed in Schedule III is guilty of a
second degree felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a first
degree felony;
(ii) a substance or a counterfeit of a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or
marijuana, or a substance listed in Section 58-37-4.2 is guilty of a third degree felony,
and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a second degree felony; or
(iii) a substance or a counterfeit of a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a
class A misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a third
degree felony.
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection (l)(a)(ii) or (iii) may
be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided by law, but if the
trier of fact finds a firearm as defined in Section 76-10-501 was used, carried, or
possessed on his person or in his immediate possession during the commission or in
furtherance of the offense, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a
term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and the court may
additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five
years to run consecutively and not concurrently.
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a)(iv) is guilty of a first degree
felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less than seven years
and which may be for life. Imposition or execution of the sentence may not be suspended,
and the person is not eligible for probation.
(2) Prohibited acts B -- Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled substance
analog or a controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or
order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of the person's professional
practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter;
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any building, room, tenement,
vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be
occupied by persons unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in

any of those locations; or
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an altered or forged
prescription or written order for a controlled substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to:
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a second degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the amount is more than 16
ounces, but less than 100 pounds, or a controlled substance analog, is guilty of a third
degree felony; or
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted resin from any part of
the plant, and the amount is more than one ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a
class A misdemeanor.
(c) Upon a person's conviction of a violation of this Subsection (2) subsequent to a
conviction under Subsection (l)(a), that person shall be sentenced to a one degree greater
penalty than provided in this Subsection (2).
(d) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all other controlled
substances not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii), including a substance listed
in Section 58-37-4.2, or less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor,
and upon a third or subsequent conviction the person is guilty of a third degree felony.
(e) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside the exterior
boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as defined in Section 64-131 or any public jail or other place of confinement shall be sentenced to a penalty one
degree greater than provided in Subsection (2)(b), and if the conviction is with respect to
controlled substances as listed in:
(i) Subsection (2)(b), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate
term as provided by law, and:
(A) the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted to a term of one year to run
consecutively and not concurrently; and
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term
not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently; and
(ii) Subsection (2)(d), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate
term as provided by law, and the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted to
a term of six months to run consecutively and not concurrently.
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(ii) or(iii) is:
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor;
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree felony.
(g) A person is subject to the penalties under Subsection (2)(h) who, in an offense not
amounting to a violation of Section 76-5-207:
(i) violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) by knowingly and intentionally having in the person's
body any measurable amount of a controlled substance; and
(ii) operates a motor vehicle as defined in Section 76-5-207 in a negligent manner,
causing serious bodily injury as defined in Section 76-1-601 or the death of another.
(h) A person who violates Subsection (2)(g) by having in the person's body:
(i) a controlled substance classified under Schedule I, other than those described in
Subsection (2)(h)(ii), or a controlled substance classified under Schedule II is guilty of a
second degree felony;
(ii) marijuana, tetrahydrocannabinols, or equivalents described in Subsection 58-374(2)(a)(iii)(S) or (AA), or a substance listed in Section 58-37-4.2 is guilty of a third
degree felony; or

(iii) any controlled substance classified under Schedules III, IV, or V is guilty of a class
A misdemeanor.
(i) A person is guilty of a separate offense for each victim suffering serious bodily injury
or death as a result of the person's negligent driving in violation of Subsection 58-378(2)(g) whether or not the injuries arise from the same episode of driving.
(3) Prohibited acts C - Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally:
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a controlled substance a
license number which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or issued to another person or, for
the purpose of obtaining a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent
oneself to be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or
other authorized person;
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to procure the administration
of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe or dispense to any person known to be
attempting to acquire or obtain possession of, or to procure the administration of any
controlled substance by misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose receiving
any controlled substance from another source, fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge,
alteration of a prescription or written order for a controlled substance, or the use of a false
name or address;
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance,
or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription or written order issued or written under
the terms of this chapter; or
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or other thing designed to
print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint,
or device of another or any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or
labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) is guilty of a third degree felony.
(4) Prohibited acts D ~ Penalties:
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not authorized under this
chapter who commits any act declared to be unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter
37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled
Substances Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under this
Subsection (4) if the trier of fact finds the act is committed:
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the grounds of any of those
schools;
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary institution or on the grounds
of any of those schools or institutions;
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other structure or grounds which
are, at the time of the act, being used for an activity sponsored by or through a school or
institution under Subsections (4)(a)(i) and (ii);
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility;
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center;
(vi) in or on the grounds of a house of worship as defined in Section 76-10-501;
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, movie house, playhouse,
or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto;
(viii) in or on the grounds of a library;
(ix) within any area that is within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included
in Subsections (4)(a)(i), (ii), (iv), (vi), and (vii);
(x) in the presence of a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of where the act
occurs; or
(xi) for the purpose of facilitating, arranging, or causing the transport, delivery, or

distribution of a substance in violation of this section to an inmate or on the grounds of
any correctional facility as defined in Section 76-8-311.3.
(b) (i) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first degree felony and
shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years if the penalty that would
otherwise have been established but for this Subsection (4) would have been a first
degree felony.
(ii) Imposition or execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not
eligible for probation.
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established would have been less
than a first degree felony but for this Subsection (4), a person convicted under this
Subsection (4) is guilty of one degree more than the maximum penalty prescribed for that
offense. This Subsection (4)(c) does not apply to a violation of Subsection (2)(g).
(d) (i) If the violation is of Subsection (4)(a)(xi):
(A) the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided
by law, and the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a term of one
year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term
not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently; and
(ii) the penalties under this Subsection (4)(d) apply also to any person who, acting with
the mental state required for the commission of an offense, directly or indirectly solicits,
requests, commands, coerces, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to commit
a violation of Subsection (4)(a)(xi).
(e) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the actor mistakenly
believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at the time of the offense or was
unaware of the individual's true age; nor that the actor mistakenly believed that the
location where the act occurred was not as described in Subsection (4)(a) or was unaware
that the location where the act occurred was as described in Subsection (4)(a).
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class B
misdemeanor.
(6) For purposes of penalty enhancement under Subsections (l)(b) and (2)(c), a plea of
guilty or no contest to a violation of this section which is held in abeyance under Title 77,
Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, is the equivalent of a conviction, even if the charge has
been subsequently reduced or dismissed in accordance with the plea in abeyance
agreement.
(7) A person may be charged and sentenced for a violation of this section,
notwithstanding a charge and sentence for a violation of any other section of this chapter.
(8) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and not in lieu
of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by law.
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of another state,
conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of another state for the same act is a
bar to prosecution in this state.
(9) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which shows a
person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or dispensed a
controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that the person or persons did
so with knowledge of the character of the substance or substances.
(10) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the course of the
veterinarian's professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing,
dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing the substances to be
administered by an assistant or orderly under the veterinarian's direction and supervision.
(11) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on:
(a) any person registered under this chapter who manufactures, distributes, or possesses

an imitation controlled substance for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a
registered practitioner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate scope of the officer's
employment.
(12) (a) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on any Indian,
as defined in Subsection 58-37-2(l)(v), who uses, possesses, or transports peyote for
bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes in connection with the practice of a traditional
Indian religion as defined in Subsection 58-37-2(l)(w).
(b) In a prosecution alleging violation of this section regarding peyote as defined in
Subsection 58-37-4(2)(a)(iii)(V), it is an affirmative defense that the peyote was used,
possessed, or transported by an Indian for bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes in
connection with the practice of a traditional Indian religion.
(c) (i) The defendant shall provide written notice of intent to claim an affirmative defense
under this Subsection (12) as soon as practicable, but not later than 10 days prior to trial,
(ii) The notice shall include the specific claims of the affirmative defense.
(iii) The court may waive the notice requirement in the interest ofjustice for good cause
shown, if the prosecutor is not unfairly prejudiced by the lack of timely notice.
(d) The defendant shall establish the affirmative defense under this Subsection (12) by a
preponderance of the evidence. If the defense is established, it is a complete defense to
the charges.
(13) (a) It is an affirmative defense that the person produced, possessed, or administered a
controlled substance listed in Section 58-37-4.2 if the person:
(i) was engaged in medical research; and
(ii) was a holder of a valid license to possess controlled substances under Section 58-376.
(b) It is not a defense under Subsection (13)(a) that the person prescribed or dispensed a
controlled substance listed in Section 58-37-4.2.
(14) It is an affirmative defense that the person possessed, in the person's body, a
controlled substance listed in Section 58-37-4.2 if:
(a) the person was the subject of medical research conducted by a holder of a valid
license to possess controlled substances under Section 58-37-6; and
(b) the substance was administered to the person by the medical researcher.
(15) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to any person or
circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter shall be given effect without
the invalid provision or application.
(16) A legislative body of a political subdivision may not enact an ordinance that is less
restrictive than any provision of this chapter.

Utah Code Annotated, Section 41-6a-517 (1953, as amended).
Definitions - Driving with any measurable controlled substance in the body Penalties - Arrest without warrant.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Controlled substance" has the same meaning as in Section 58-37-2.
(b) "Practitioner" has the same meaning as in Section 58-37-2.
(c) "Prescribe" has the same meaning as in Section 58-37-2.
(d) "Prescription" has the same meaning as in Section 58-37-2.
(2) In cases not amounting to a violation of Section 41-6a-502, a person may not operate
or be in
actual physical control of a motor vehicle within this state if the person has any
measurable controlled substance or metabolite of a controlled substance in the person's
body.
(3) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this section that the controlled
substance was:
(a) involuntarily ingested by the accused;
(b) prescribed by a practitioner for use by the accused; or
(c) otherwise legally ingested.
(4) (a) A person convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor.
(b) A person who violates this section is subject to conviction and sentencing under both
this section and any applicable offense under Section 58-37-8.
(5) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation of this section
when the officer has probable cause to believe the violation has occurred, although not in
the officer's presence, and if the officer has probable cause to believe that the violation
was committed by the person.
(6) The Driver License Division shall, if the person is 21 years of age or older on the date
of arrest:
(a) suspend, for a period of 120 days, the driver license of a person convicted under
Subsection (2) of an offense committed on or after July 1,- 2009; or
(b) revoke, for a period of two years, the driver license of a person if:
(i) the person has a prior conviction as defined under Subsection 41-6a-501(2); and
(ii) the current violation under Subsection (2) is committed on or after July 1, 2009, and
within a period of 10 years after the date of the prior violation.
(7) The Driver License Division shall, if the person is 19 years of age or older but under
21 years of age on the date of arrest:
(a) suspend, until the person is 21 years of age or for a period of one year, whichever is
longer, the driver license of a person convicted under Subsection (2) of an offense
committed on or after July 1, 2011; or
(b) revoke, until the person is 21 years of age or for a period of two years, whichever is
longer, the driver license of a person if:
(i) the person has a prior conviction as defined under Subsection 41-6a-501(2); and
(ii) the current violation under Subsection (2) is committed on or after July 1, 2009, and
within a period of 10 years after the date of the prior violation.
(8) The Driver License Division shall, if the person is under 19 years of age on the date
of arrest:
(a) suspend, until the person is 21 years of age, the driver .license of a person convicted
under Subsection (2) of an offense committed on or after July 1, 2009; or

(b) revoke, until the person is 21 years of age, the driver license of a person if:
(i) the person has a prior conviction as defined under Subsection 41 -6a-501(2); and
(ii) the current violation under Subsection (2) is committed on or after July 1, 2009, and
within a period of 10 years after the date of the prior violation.
(9) The Driver License Division shall subtract from any suspension or revocation period
the number of days for which a license was previously suspended under Section 53-3-223
or 53-3-231, if the previous suspension was based on the Same occurrence upon which
the record of conviction is based.
(10) The Driver License Division shall:
(a) deny, suspend, or revoke a person's license for the denial and suspension periods in
effect prior to July 1, 2009, for a conviction of a violation under Subsection (2) that was
committed prior to July 1, 2009; or
(b) deny, suspend, or revoke the operator's license of a person for the denial, suspension,
or revocation periods in effect from July 1, 2009, through June 30, 2011, if:
(i) the person was 20 years of age or older but under 21 years of age at the time of arrest;
and
(ii) the conviction under Subsection (2) is for an offense that was committed on or after
July 1, 2009, and prior to July 1, 2011.
(11) A court that reported a conviction of a violation of this section for a violation that
occurred on or after July 1, 2009, to the Driver License Division may shorten the
suspension period imposed under Subsection (7)(a) or (8)(a) prior to completion of the
suspension period if the person:
(a) (i) for a license suspension imposed under Subsection (7)(a), completes at least six
months of the license suspension; or
(ii) for a license suspension imposed under Subsection (8)(a), completes at least two
years of the license suspension;
(b) completes a screening;
(c) completes an assessment, if it is found appropriate by a screening under Subsection
(ll)(b);
(d) completes substance abuse treatment if it is found appropriate by the assessment
under Subsection (1 l)(c);
(e) completes an educational series if substance abuse treatment is not required by the
assessment under Subsection (1 l)(c) or the court does not order substance abuse
treatment;
(f) has not been convicted of a violation of any motor vehicle law in which the person
was involved as the operator of the vehicle during the suspension period imposed under
Subsection (7)(a) or (8)(a);
(g) has complied with all the terms of the person's probation or all orders of the court if
not ordered to probation; and
(h) (i) is 18 years of age or older and provides a sworn statement to the court that the
person has not consumed a controlled substance not prescribed by a practitioner for use
by the person or unlawfully consumed alcohol during the suspension period imposed
under Subsection (7)(a) or (8)(a); or
(ii) is under 18 years of age and has the person's parent or legal guardian provide an
affidavit or other sworn statement to the court certifying that to the parent or legal
guardian's knowledge the person has not consumed a controlled substance not prescribed
by a practitioner for use by the person or unlawfully consumed alcohol during the
suspension period imposed under Subsection (7)(a) or (8)(a).
(12) If the court shortens a person's license suspension period in accordance with the
requirements of Subsection (11), the court shall forward the order shortening the person's
license suspension period prior to the completion of the suspension period imposed under

Subsection (7)(a) or (8)(a) to the Driver License Division.
(13) (a) The court shall notify the Driver License Division if a person fails to:
(i) complete all court ordered screening and assessment, educational series, and substance
abuse treatment; or
(ii) pay all fines and fees, including fees for restitution and treatment costs.
(b) Upon receiving the notification, the division shall suspend the person's driving
privilege in accordance with Subsections 53-3-221(2) and (3).
(14) The court shall order supervised probation in accordance with Section 41-6a-507 for
a person convicted under Subsection (2).

Utah Code Annotated 78A-4-103 (1953, as amended).
Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to issue all
writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory
appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state
agencies or appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of
the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and
Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire, and State Lands
actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources,
Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the state or other
local agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63G-3-602;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except those
involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a conviction
or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony;
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons who are
incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting a
challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree or capital felony;
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions
of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first degree or capital
felony;
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not
limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, parent-time,
visitation, adoption, and paternity;
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four judges of the
court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate review and determination
any matter over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63G, Chapter 4,
Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
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3
4

THE COURT: State of Utah vs. Levi Wickward, case
No. 101500381.

5

MR. BURNS: Good morning.

6

MS. ALLEN: Your Honor, I'm going to be calling Officer

7

Iverson first.

8

THE COURT: Your other witnesses?

9

MS. ALLEN: Possibly Tenille Turner.

10

(Counsel conferring off the record)

11

MS. ALLEN: With regard to the 382 case, it's going to

12

be Officer Iverson, Tenille Turner and possibly Nic Gibson.

13
14

THE COURT: Well, we're going to proceed with the 381
case

first.

Who are you going to call in that

case?

15

MS. ALLEN: The 381 case is Mr. Slack's case.

16

THE COURT: Oh, all right.

17

with the 382 case.

18

else, Counsel?

19
20
21

Well, then let's proceed

Officer Iverson, Tenille Turner and who

MS. ALLEN: Possibly Nic Johnson.
before.

Sorry, I mis-spoke

It was Nic Johnson.
THE COURT: All right.

If each of the witness would

22

please stand, raise their right hands and take the oath.

23

Ms. Turner present?

Is

24

MS,. ALLEN: She is, your Honor.

25

THE COURT: Ms. Turner, if you'll stand, raise your

-41

right hand and take the oath, please.
COURT CLERK: Do you and each of you solemnly swear

2

case will be

3

that t.he testimony you are about to give in this

4

the truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

5

(Witnesses affirm the oath)

6

COURT CLERK: Thank you.

7

MS. ALLEN: Officer Iverson first, your Honor.

8

THE COURT: All right.

9

and take a seat, please.
MR. BURNS: Your Honor, we would like to invoke the

10
11

Officer, if you'll come forward

exclusionary rule at this time.

12

THE COURT: All right, if the other witnesses would

13

remove themselves, please, from the courtroom, not discuss

14

their testimony, and we'll call you when it's time for you to

15

testify.

16

OFFICER IVERSON,

17

having been first duly sworn,

18

testified as follows:

19

DIRECT EXAMINATION

20

BY MS

21

Q

22

ALLEN:
Officer Iverson, you are a deputy with the Iron County

Sheriff's Department; is that right?

23

A

Yes, ma'am.

24

Q

You're a fully certified category one peace officer?

25

A

Yes, ma'am.
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2

Q.

All right, and on the date of June 29th, 2010 were you

working as a peace officer here in Iron County?

3

A.

Yes, ma'am.

4

Q.

Can you tell us how you came to have contact with Mr.

5

Levi Wic kward?
Yes, I was stationary on the freewayc just south of

6

A.

7

Cedar City.

I was running radar, and Levi was heading the

8

northbou nd.

I radared him -- my radar, my visual (inaudible)

9

about 85 miles an hour.

10

So I conducted a traffic stop on the

vehicle, and that's how we made contact.

11

Q.

Okay, and was he the driver of that vehicle?

12

A.

Yes, ma'am.

13

Q.

Is he seated here at Counsel table next to Mr. Burns?

14

A.

Yes, ma'am.

15

Q.

All right.

16
17

All right, after you conducted the traffic

stop, di d you begin engaging the driver in a conversation?
A.

I approached the vehicle from the passenger's side,

18

just for officer safety reasons.

19

the passenger Tenille and the driver were going through paper-

20

work.

21

and the passenger to show me their hands, and asked the driver

22

to put h is hands on the wheel.

23

where th ey were going.

24

game or something.

25

1

Q.

As I approached the vehicle,

Their hands were going everywhere.

To Cedar City?

I asked the driver

I asked him what was going on,

They said to St. George to a softball

,
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A.

Or to Cedar City.

2

Q.

Okay.

3

A.

I apologize, to Cedar City for a Softball game.

The

4

driver, Mr. Wickward, said that -- I asked him for his driver's

5

license.

6

the seat again.

7

seemed - - they put off a nervous vibe , 1'. guess you could call

8

it.

He said he can't find it.

He started reaching under

That seemed suspicious to mex and the behavior

9

Q.

Uh-huh.

10

A.

So I had the driver exit the vehicle.

I actually had

11

the passenger exit the vehicle first, and then I went to the

12

driver's side and escorted Mr. Wickwa rd out of the vehicle.

13
14
15

Q.

Okay, and at some point did you gain consent to search

both Mr. Wickward and the vehicle?
A.

Yes, ma'am, I asked -- first I asked Mr. Wickward if

16

he had anything illegal, or any drugs or anything like that in

17

the vehicle.

18

if I cou Id search the vehicle.

19

At that time Deputy Quinn Averett and Corporal Johnson were

20

talking with the passenger, Tenille - -

Mr. Wickward said that he did not

21

Q.

Uh-huh.

22

A.

—

23
24
25

I asked him

He said, "It's not my car."

and Officer Averett came to me and said that she

gave consent to search the vehicle.
Q.

Okay, and what did you find —

well, c id you have

occasion t6 find some pills in the possession c f Mr. Wickward?
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2

A.

At the time-- I didn't find any pills on Mr. Wickward.

I asked him -- all I did was a quick Terry frisk for weapons

3

Q.

4

A.

Uh-huh.
on his person, asked him if he had anything on him.
vv

5

He said,

6

found aluminum foil, some straws that looked like they might

7

be used for smoking, a pan that was gutted out, which kind of

8

matched, you know, the story later on.

9

—

No."

As far as the inside of the vehicle goes, we

Then what else, we found some tinfoil in a box that

10

was taped up, wrapped up, and when I shook it I couldn't hear

11

any noise, so it seemed empty to me.

12

was talking to Deputy Averett and Deputy Johnson; and he said

13

has prescription medication that he has a prescription for.

14

They asked him where it was-- this was coming from the deputies

15

--and they said that -- or he told them it was in that package.

16
17
18
19

Q.

At that time Mr. Wickward

Okay, so in fact did you ultimately open it and

discovery some pills in the package?
A.

Yes, we opened the package and we discovered a green

prescription bottle.

20

Q.

Uh-huh.

21

A.

It had a paper towel stuffed inside, and the pills

22

were down at the bottom.

23

they wouldn't shake and make noise when you shook the box.

24

was also covered in bubble wrap.

25

Q.

Okay.

It looked like he put it in there so
It
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1
2
3
4

A.

And the sticker was ripped off the prescription

bottle.
Q.

Did the defendant admit to you that those were Oxy-

codones and Diazepam?

5

A.

He said they were oxy's, which was Oxycodone, and --

6

Q.

Uh-huh.

7

A.

-- I think the other one he said they were Valium --

8

Q.

Okay.

9

A.

-- which I think is the Diazepam.

10

Q.

All right, and did you -- did you also have occasion

11

to have McKell Cantenia, the trained lab technician at the

12

sheriff fs department ID those pills?

13

A.

14

tested it.

15

Q.

What did she ID those pills as?

16

A.

As Diazepam and Oxycodone.

17
18

Yes, I logged them into evidence, and she —

she also

MR. BURNS: Your Honor, I'm going to object on the
basis o f hearsay.

19

THE COURT: Ms. Allen?

20

MS. ALLEN: Your Honor, we're talking about a lab

21

result.

22

results in preliminary hearings.

The rule specifically allows the admission of lab
She's

—

23

THE COURT: Isn't that right, Mr. Burns?

24

MF\. BURNS: That --

25

THfe COURT: Under Rule 1102?

-91

MR. BURNS: That's correct, but we're not talking about

2

lab results.

We're talking about a statement made from some-

3

body to somebody else about lab results.

4

THE COURT: Does Rule 11 --

5

MR. BURNS: That's another level of hearsay.

6

THE COURT: Does Rule 1102 distinguish between test

7

results that are orally recorded versus those that are reported

8

in writing?

\9

MR. BURNS: Your Honor, I can't recall. My recollection

10

is that reports can be -- can be submitted at preliminary

11

hearing, and basically subverted to get around the hearsay

12

rule.

13

THE COURT: Is there not a written report, Ms. Allen?

14

MS. ALLEN: There is, your Honor, but I'm just laying

15

the foundation for that at this point.

16

THE COURT: All right, then the objection is sustained.

17

MS. ALLEN: I don't —

I don't know, your Honor, that

18

the -- that it distinguishes between written and oral> -Is that

19

something that the Court has addressed?

20

THE COURT: Do you want to tell me what the rule says?

21

MS. ALLEN: I don't have access to my book, but I could

22

look at it, I suppose.

23

THE COURT: Are you going to offer the written reports?

24

MS. ALLEN: I intend to do that right now.

25

THE COURT: Why don't we just do that, then.
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2
3

MS. ALLEN: Okay.
Q.

All right.

BY MS. ALLEN: This is the report that you got from

Ms. Ca ntenia ; is that correct?

4

A.

Yes , ma'am.

5

Q.

All right.

6

Honor.

I would -- I would offer those, your

Mr. Burns has seen those.

7

MR. BURNS: Your Honor

8

THE COURT: Mr. Burns, any objection?

9

MR. BURNS: Your Honor, I'm looking for them.

10

know that I have seen them.

11

objections.

—

I don't

No, your Honor, I don' t have any

12

THE COURT: And the reports

13

MS. ALLEN: I'11 mark --

14

THE COURT: -- is it one report or two?

15

MS. ALLEN: It's one.

—

I can —

I can - - I don't know

16

why I have two copies of them, but just in case , I'11 paperclip

17

them together and mark them as one exhibit.

18

THE COURT: The report is received as State' s Exhibit 1.

19
20

(Exhibit No. 1 received into evidence)

°'

BY MS. ALLEN: All right, the package

that you found

21

these pills contained in —

22

it the case that Oxycodone is a schedule one or two controlled

23

substance?

24

A.

25

report

well, first; of all, let me ask, is

I believe it's a schedule -- I'll have to refer to my

J
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Q.

Okay, that's all right.

2

A.

Schedule two is the Oxycodone.

3

Q

All right, and is it also the case that Diazepam is a

4

'

schedule four controlled substance?

5

A.

Yes, it is.

6

Q.

All right.

The package that you found the pills in,

7

is it th e case that it was a mailing box, or can you describe

8

that at all?

9

A.

It was a cardboard box I'd say about twelve inches by

10

four inc hes.

11

it or an ything like that, as far as that goes; but it was all

12

taped up and sealed up, like it was getting ready to be mailed.

13
14

Q.

It was all taped up.

Okay, all right, did the defendant make any statements

with reg ard to intending to mail the package at all?

15

A.

The defendant did not.

16

Q.

Okay.

17

I didn't see any postage on

Did you -- did law enforcement have occasion to

take ai urine sample from Mr. Wickward?

18

A.

His parole officer took the urine sample.

19

Q.

Okay, and was it field tested?

20

A.

Yes, it was.

21

Q.

Did it test positive for THC, among other substances?

22

A.

Yes, tested positive for THC, Oxy and looks like

23

Bezio.

24

Q-

Benzos?

25

A.

Benzos.

\
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2

Q.

Did you indicate that he was the driver of this

vehicl e when you stopped it?

3

A.

Yes, ma'am.

4

Q.

Okay, with regard to the distribution elements, did

5

you -- and we're going to hear from Ms. Turner about that

6

somewhat, but did you seize a cell phone from Mr. Wickward?

7
8

A.

Yes, I also have a letter from him from the jail,

i

asking for his cell phone back.

9

Q.

Okay, but you did seize his cell phone?

10

A.

Yes, ma'am.

11

Q.

Did you find various admissions from the defendant on

12

the ce 11 phone that led you to conclude that he was engaged, or

13

intend ing to engage in some distribution efforts?

14

MR. BURNS: Objection, leading.

15

THE WITNESS: Yes, I did find some --

16

THE COURT: Just a second, Officer.

17
18
19
20

How is it leading;

does i t suggest an answer, Mr. Burns?
MR. BURNS: It-- basically it's eliciting the "testimony
or the very statement that I think is --

THE COURT: I think

it

doesn't

suggest

an answer.

So I

21

think what the question does is point the officer to a specific

22

line o f questioning, which I don't think is inappropriate.

23

I think it merely helps us get to the evidence qu icker, and

24

again, it's; not leading, because it didn't suggest an answer.

25

So the objection is overruled.

I
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1
2

Your Honor, if I ma y approach with

MS. ALLEN: Okay.
the —

with the text.

3

Q.

BY MS. ALLEN: Th is is your only copy, isn't it?

4

A.

Yes, ma'am.

5

Q.

All right, we ma y need to share these

So did you

6

find a dmissions from the defendant's -- the defendant on those

|

7

phones that suggest his intentions with regard to those pills?

!

8

A.

Yes, ma'am.

•9

Q.

Could you share with us some of those admissions as

10
11

you ob served them?
A.

Yes, ma'am.

One is from Dopey Dopey, which is on his

Said, "Hey, man --xv or sorry, this is from Gus C,

12

cell phone.

13

and th is is from him.

14

Q.

From --

15

A.

Or sorry, from Mr. Wickward to Gus C.

16

man, what's up?

17

money, but the extra $35 I put --NV or sorry,

18

was all the money I had.

19

doubt and hope you make things right with me.

20

filled and took care of i t.

21

it right."

22

Q.

23

It says, "Hey,

You took not only one of my best friend's
NV

35 I put in;

I am giving you the benefit of the
I got my script

You're just going to have to make

That was sent June 2 9th.

That would have —

that was June 29th, the same day

that y ou arrested him?

24

A.

Ilet' s see.

25

Q.

You've previousl y testified that you arrested him on
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June 29th, 2010.

2

A.

On 6/29, 2000 -- I'm sorry, yes, ma'am.

3

Q.

No, no, okay.

All right, and your -- that text, is

4

it the case that that was sent around what time?

5

there on the text.

It indicates

6

A.

At 6:21 p.m.

7

Q.

Okay, and is it the case that you stopped him at

8

around 7:05 p.m?

9

A.

I believe so, ma'am, yes.

10

Q.

Okay, and talk to us about the text that specifically

11
12

refers to having some pills for sale.
A.

It says, "Well, that depends.

If you buy more than

13

15 I will -- this once.

14

I've got Roxys and Valiums I need to get rid of.

15

Roxys and two Valiums."

16

Valiums I need to get rid of" was sent to Mark 0 on 5 -- at

17

5:57 p.m., Tuesday, June 29th.

18

Q.

19

22
23

I left two

This is -- the "I've got Roxys and

You can -- hold up, just a second.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

20
21

Okay.

I'm not having any problem with 12.50.

Q.

BY MS. ALLEN: Okay, so —

so could you repeat that one

and tell us the time?
A.
of."

24

Q.

25

phone?

It says, "I've got Roxys and Valiums I need to get rid
He sent that at 5:57 p.m. Tuesday, June 29ch.
All right, and that was sent from Mr. Wickward's cell
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A.

Yes, ma'am.

2

Q.

All right.

3

to Mr. Wickward?

4

A.

5
6

How about this one from another individual

That's from Dopey Dopey to Mr. Wickward.
THE COURT: Wouldn't that be hearsay, Ms. Allen?

not the defendant's statement.

7

MS. ALLEN: Your Honor, I would -- I would indicate

8

that it just -- it's not being offered to prove the truth

9

of the matter asserted, but only to indicate the intent of

10

It's

Mr. Wickward with regard to his medication.

11

THE COURT: Are you suggesting that someone else's

12

statement can be used to establish the intent of the defendant?

13

MS. ALLEN: No, no. What I mean is, it's in the context

14

of their exchange, it just provides some --

15

THE COURT: If you want to offer it

16

MS. ALLEN: —

17

THE COURT: -- just to put the defendant's response in

—

foundation for it.

18

context, and not have it received for the truth of the matter

19

asserted, we can do that.

20
21

MS. ALLEN: That's what I —
do.

22
23
24
25

that's what I intend to

THE COURT: All right.
Q.

BY MS. ALLEN: Okay, so if you could just indicate this

-- this on^e here.
A.

It says, "Hey, will you front me some until tomorrow?"
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2
3

This is from Dopey Dopey.
Q.

Was that sent —

was that received after the one about

''I've got Roxys and Valiums I need to get rid of"?

4

A.

Yes, ma'am.

5

Q.

Okay, another statement with regard to the defendant,

6

another text from his phone, could you -- could you read that?
XV

7

A.

It says,

8

Q.

Okay, and this was sent to?

9

A.

Dopey Dopey at 5:57 p.m.

10

Q.

Okay.

11

I left two Roxys and two Valiums."

All right, and then -- okay, was there another

one that you wanted to call to our attention?

12

A.

Yes, it's this one of Mark.

13

Q.

Was there another text again from another individual

14
15

but to provide context for a response?
A.

Yes, it's -- this one's from Mark 0, and it's to

16

Mr. Wickward, "I know you're -- I know who you are.

17

is Mark's buddy, Justin.

18

get them for $10 a piece, because --xv or sorry, "10 a piece,

19

because 12.50 is too much."

I'll get some of -- some if I can

20

Q.

Okay.

21

A.

This was sent at -- I'm not sure the time.

22

This

It shows

it on yours.

23

Q.

At 6:04 p . m . ;

is that

right?

24

A.

Yfes,

25

Q.

I'm going to have you retain those.

ma'am.
Okay, at some

1

point did —

2

conduct?

was the defendant taken into custody for this

3

A.

Yes, ma'am.

4

Q.

All right, and was he booked into the jail?

5

A.

Yes, ma'am.

6

Q.

Without going into all the details of the jail, d

7

was a strip search conducted on him at that jail?

8

A.

I believe so, ma'am.

9

Q.

Okay, and did additional packages of pills fall f

10

his underwear when he was being strip searched?

11

MR. BURNS: Objection, foundation.

12

he was present.

13

question is.

I don't know t

I don't know what the foundation for this

14

THE COURT: Were you present, Officer?

15

THE WITNESS: No, sir.

16

THE COURT: All right, sustained as to foundation.

17
18

Q.

BY MS. ALLEN: All right.

Do you know whether an

officer strip searched him?

19

A.

Yes, ma'am.

20

Q.

Do you know who that officer would have been?

21

A.

I believe Corporal Johnson and this officer here.

22

don't know his name.

23

Q.

Is that Officer Inglested?

24

A.

Ihglested.

25

Q.

Ail right.
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A.

I apologize.

2

Q.

Did they relate to you whether or not some pills had

3

fallen from his underwear when he was strip searched?

4

A.

Yes, ma'am.

5

Q.

Okay, and did -- did they relate to you that those

6

matched the pills that you also found in his vehicle?

7

A.

Yes, they did.

8

Q.

Did they also relate to you that he admitted that

9
10

those were also Roxy's and Valiums, or Diazepam?
A.

11

Yes, ma' am.
MS. ALLEN: Okay, and I'll -- I'll submit results when

12

we have that hearing, your Honor.

13

anything else.

14

Q.

Let me just see if there's

BY MS. ALLEN: The other items you talked about in

15

the car, the sawed off pen and that sort of thing, talk to us

16

specifically about what you identified as drug paraphernalia.

17
18

A.
one side

I believe the pen that was gutted out, it was burnt on
—

19

Q.

Uh-huh.

20

A.

-- and then there was also a straw.

21

Q.

What was it about that pen that you identified as drug

22
23

paraphernalia?
A.

That it was burnt on one side, I know, from my exper-

24

ience, whalt I've been taught, and drugs at POST, that people

25

will smoke'their medication through pens, because it makes a

-19
goo d

P

ipe.
MS. ALLEN: Okay.

I think that' s all my questions for

now , your Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Burns, cross examination?
MR. BURNS: Thank you.
CROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. BURNS:
Q.

Good morning, Officer.

A.

Good morning.

Q.

Based upon your testimony, it's my understanding that

you stopped the veh icle for speeding on June 2 9th; is that -A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

—

correct ?

Then subsequent to the stop , you asked

for a consent to search the vehicle?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Why did yo u ask for consent to search th e vehicle?

A.

Because of their reactions and their nervous behavior

the y were showing.

I asked the driver -- I asked the driver

severa 1 times to keep his hands out from under th e seat.

He

later indicated he was looking for his driver's 1 icense, or
his wa llet.
Q.

Okay, and isn't a driver's lie -- is a d river's

license normally re quired during a traff ic stop?

Do you

normally aak -A.

Ye's, I ask him for it.

Instead of reach ing under
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2
3

their seat, I say, "Don't worry about
Q.

it."

Okay, you just stated that " due to their reactions."

What were they reacting to; do you know?

4

A.

5

paper.

6

I do traffic stops that the passenger 's going through their

7

purse.

8

times to keep his hands on the wheel,

That the passenger was going through her purse without
So I did that unfamiliar -- or that's not normal when

Then the driver, like I said, I had to ask him several
When I pull ed him out of

• 9 the ve h i d e , he also looked bac k at the vehicle several times,
10

which is usually an indicator that th ere's something in the

11

vehicl e.

12
13

Q.

Okay, and it was based upon that conduct that you

asked for consent to search?

14

A.

Yes, sir.

15

Q.

Okay.

You stated that you - - that you -- well,

16

actually let me go to the -- th e purpose of arrest .

17

originally arrested -- when you took Mr. Wickward into custody

18

the fi rst time, what was that - - when was that?

You

19

A.

20

initia ted.

21

Q.

Okay, was it after his consent to search?

22

A.

It was -- yes, sir, it was a fter the consent to

23

It was on the freeway, where the traffic stop was

search •

24

Q.

When was it after the consent to search?

25

A.

Deputy Averett and Depijty

--

and Corporal Johnson were
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talking to him about the medi —

2

They ki nd of conducted that.

3
4

Q.

the prescription medi cation.

I was talking to the witness.

So upon his consent to search, what -- where did Levi

go; was he on the side of the road?

5

A.

He was standing --

6

Q.

Up on the vehicle?

7

A.

-- behind the vehicl e with me.

When I was in the

8

middle of asking for consent to search, Quinn Averett, Deputy

9

Averett overheard me and said that the owner of the ve h i d e ,

10

which was Tenille, the

11

time, s he gave us consent to search the vehicle.

12
13
14

Q.

passen ger, which I found out at that

Okay, so upon -- upon receiving consent, you -- did

you sta y with Mr. Wickward or -A.

Oh, yes, I walked up to the front of the car with

15

Mr. Wic kward.

16

of the vehicle.

For officer sa fety we had him go to the front

17

Q.

Okay.

18

A.

I talked to him for several minutes about whe^re he was

19

going a nd things like that.

20

Q.

Who conducted the search?

21

A.

I came back to -help Corporal Johnson conduct the

22

search.

23

the driver's side.

24
25

Q.

So he searched on th e passenger side, I searched on

Okay, and during the search of the vehicle you found

prescri ption medication?

-22A.
cation.

I found a box.
I found the box.

I didn't find the prescription mediWhen the other deputies interviewed

Mr. Wickward, he said, "That's where I keep my prescription."
Q.

Okay.

Do you know if Mr. Wickward was given his

Miranda rights any time during this process?
A.

As far as I know, I didn't give him Miranda because

I wasn't around him.

I was with Tenille most of the time.

Q.

Okay.

A.

So I think when he went into custody, I'm sure Deputy

-- Corporal Johnson may have read Miranda rights, but I don't
know the exact time.
Q.

Okay.

Did you hear Corporal Johnson read him his

Miranda rights?
A.

I haven't -- I didn't hear Miranda rights read at that

time .
Q.

Did Corporal Johnson later relate to you that he was

read his Miranda rights?
A.

No, he did not.

Q.

Okay.

Do you know if my client made any statements

regardin g the prescription medications in the car?
A.

I'm sorry?

Q.

Did he claim the prescription medication?

Did he say

that the y were his?
A.

Yds, he said that's where he keeps them is in —

his

prescription he says he keeps enough on him, because he was in
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2
3

pain, to help out with his medical needs.
Q.

Okay, and did he indicate that they were prescribed

to him 7

4

A.

Yes.

5

Q.

Okay.

During your investigation in this matter have

6

you run any DOPL or Division of Occupational Professional

7

Licensing checks on my client to see if he was prescribed this

8

medication?

9

A.

No, I did not.

10

Q.

Okay.

You also stated that during your -- well, let's

11

back u p.

12

arrest my client?

13

A.

So you searched the vehicle.

At w hat time did you

After we opened up the package, Dep uty Averett opened

14

up the package and saw that the prescription had a sticker

15

ripped off, indicating that he was going to distribute --

16

Tenill e said that he was shipping that box.

17

it thr ough the post office in St. George to that -- because of

18

that information, that gave us reasonable -- or sorry, probable

19

cause to place him under arrest.

20
21

Q.

He tried to ship

Okay, was there -- do you know if there was a 72 hour

probat ion hold involved --

22

A.

I do not know.

23

Q.

-- on this arrest?

Okay, and so as far as you're

24

concerned ait that point in time you arrested him for possession

25

of a controlled substance with intent to distribute?
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1

A.

Yes, sir.

2

Q.

Okay.

3
4

You also stated that you, when searching the

car r you found a cell phone; is that accurate?
A.

I don't recall when they had the cell phone,

I think

5

it was - - it might have been on Levi's possession, but I ' m not

6

100 percent sure.

7
8
9

Q.

So you don't know where the cell phone came from, if

it was on his person or in the car?
A.

I don't remember where I got it.

I'd have to refer to

10

my report.

11

Q.

Why do you believe it to be Levi' s cell phone?

12

A.

Because he asked me if he could use it when he was

13

texting from it in the car, saying that he was in handcu ffs in

14

the back vehicle -- in the vehicle he asked if he could use the

15

phone to make a phone call.

16

Q.

Okay, and it was that phone that he was using?

17

A.

Yes, sir.

18

Q.

Why are you certain of that?

19

A.

Because.this is the phone that we took from him when

20
21
22
23
24
25

he had i t in his car —
Q.

Okay.

in his pocket behind the vehicle

So you then transported -- I'm assuming that

you then transported my client back to the jail?
A.
him .
Q.

I did not transport him.

Corpora 1 Johnson transported

I st4yed there until the vehicle got impounded.
Okay, who -- who received or who kept the evide nee;

\
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was that you?

2

A.

I kept -- yes, sir, I kept the evidence.

3

Q.

Okay.

Let's talk about the jail.

You talked about

4

some prescription medication in my client's underwear at the

5

jail.

6

testimon y with other officers; is that correct?

It sounds like your knowledge of that is based upon

7

A.

Yes, sir.

8

Q.

Who did you have that conversation with?

9

A.

Corporal Johnson and Deputy Inglested asked me for

10
11

pictures of it when he got here.
Q.

Is it your understanding that the -- that those --

12

those prescription medications were found during the strip

13

search o f my client?

14

A.

I believe so, yes, sir.

15

Q.

Okay.

Is it your understand -- do you know if when

16

those were found-- you. stated they were found in his underwear;

17

is that accurate?

18

A.

That's what I was told, sir, yes.

19

Q.

Okay.

20

Do you know whether he was wearing his under-

wear at the time or not, when they were found?

21

A.

I did not check, sir.

22

Q.

You don't know the answer to that?

23

A.

No, sir.

24

Q.

Hid you booked people into the jail before?

25

A.

Yes, sir.
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Q.

Do you know what they do with their clothing?

2

A.

I didn't get to that process, no, sir.

3

Q.

Okay, do you know if the clothing was held in their

4

personal property?

5

A.

I believe that's what they do with the clothes, sir.

6

Q.

Would that include the underwear?

7

A.

I'm --

8

Q.

Do you know?

\9

A.

—

10

Q.

Okay, when did you —

not 100 percent sure; but I would assume so.
Ms. Allen has handed you some

11

pictures of text messages that it was your testimony that you

12

—

you pulled off the phone.

13

A.

Yes, sir.

14

Q.

Is that —

15

okay.

When did you -- when did you look at

or retrieve those messages?

16

A.

This morning before I -- before I got here.

17

Q.

Okay.

18

Did you go through the phone and retrieve them

anytime before that?

19

A.

No, sir.

20

Q.

Did you receive a warrant to go through the phone?

21

A.

No, sir.

22

Q.

Okay, and where was the phone being held?

23

A.

In evidence.

24

MR. BURNS: Okay.

I have nothing further, your Honor.

25

THE COURT: Anything else, Ms. Allen?
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MS. ALLEN: Just a couple things, your Honor.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION

2
3

BY MS, ALLEN:

4

Q.

i

With regard to the searching and the phone, just

5

generailly, because we're not at a suppression hearing, is --

6

were you aware that Mr. Wickward was on supervised probation

7

with AP&P at the time you were working on his case?

8

A.

Yes, ma'am.

9

Q.

Did you contact Alan Julian with AP&P when you were on

10

scene working with Mr. Wickward?

11

A.

Yes, ma'am.

12

Q.

Did Mr. Julian give you permission and work with you

13

on the» search of Mr. Wickward's phone and other locations?

14
15
16

A.
it.

Yes, he initially worked with Deputy Quinn Averett on

Deputy Quinn Averett relayed the messages to me.
Q.

Okay.

All right, the —

when we talk about THC being

17

present in his urine, are -- are we referring to a marijuana

18

derivative, to your knowledge?

19

A.

I would assume so.

20

Q.

Okay, and then the -- the pills seized from the under-

21

wear, when I spoke with you about that, you indicated that you

22

had been told that they had dropped from his underwear; is that

23

your recollection?

24

A.

Yjes, ma' am.

25

Q.

All right, and do you have a picture of those, just so

i

j
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2

we can get some ID on quantity?
A.

3
4
5
6

(Counsel conferring off the record)
Q.

Is this a picture of the pills that were seized from

the un<derwear?
A.

7
8

Yes, I do.

I believe so.
MS. ALLEN: I would move to mark this as an exhibit,

your H<Dnor, or at least have the Court look at it.

9

THE COURT: Any objection, Mr. Burns?

10

MR. BURNS: Yes, your Honor.
xx

11

founda —

12

I object on foundation, your Honor.

13

I don't believe that

he believes so/' it doesn't sound -- foundation.

THE COURT: All right, sustained.

14

Q.

BY MS. ALLEN: Do you know what this is a picture of?

15

A.

Yes, ma'am.

16

Q.

What is it a picture of?

17

A.

Those are prescription medications.

18

Q.

Were these the pills that were found in the underwear

19
20

of the defendant?
A.

Yes, ma'am.

21

THE COURT: Who took the photograph, Deputy?

22

THE WITNESS: I do not know, your Honor.

23

THE COURT: How do you know it was taken of the medi-

24
25

cation that you've been referring to on the 29:" or 30lh of June?
MR. WITNESS: Because sworn officer -- two of my sworn

1
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officers stated this was the medication that came out of --

2

THE COURT: Told you that?

3

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

4

THE COURT: All right.

5

MR. BURNS: No objection, your Honor.

6

THE COURT: Then the photograph is received as State's

7

Mr. Burns?

Exhibit 2 .

8

(Exhibit No. 2 received into evidence)

9

MS. ALLEN: You're going to give us these back, aren't

10

you, ]ust in case --

11

THE COURT: (No verbal response).

12

Q.

BY MS. ALLEN: Mr. Burns talked to you about those

13

text messages on the phone.

14

occasion prior to this morning to at least view those on the

15

phone?

16

A.

Yes, I did.

17

Q.

All right, and is it the case that you and the other

18

Is it the case that you had had

officers viewed those on the phone at the scene?

19

A.

Deputy Quinn Averett viewed these --

20

Q.

Okay.

21

A.

-- texts at the scene.

22

Q.

All right.

23

A.

He did -- he did show me one.

24
25

vx

I think it was the

Fill my -4-xv "I've just filled my script."
Q.

Okay.

All right.
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1

MS. ALLEN: Are you finished with th at, your H<Dnor?

2

THE COURT: (No verbal response).

3

MS. ALLEN: I think that's all my questions.

4

MR. BURNS: Just one.

5

THE COURT: Mr. Burns?

6

MR. BURNS: Just one followup.
RECROSS EXAMINATION

7
8
9
10
11

BY MR. BURNS :
Q.

Based upon what you just stated, it 's my unde trstanding

that 1 aw enforcement went through the phone on the roadside?
A.

No, I apologize for the misunderstanding.

12

the -jail -- at the scene.

13

well.

It was at

We consider that at the scene, as

14

Q.

Okay.

15

A.

Because that's where we discovered the text, <and now

16
17
18
19

it was more evidence.
Q.

So it was at the jail; and when was that-in relation

to my client 's arrest?
A.

It was aft er he was already booked in.

The p<arole

20

officer met us out there to -- to talk with Quinn Averett.

21

Quinn had th e phone

22

there was a search and seizure clause on his probation or

23

whatever.

24

script when I was walking in with Tenille.

25

Q.

They talked about it.

They said that

They showed me -- he showed me th e text and the

Oka y, so i t was subsequent to either yourself or
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Mr. Averett speaking with Adult Probation and Parole?

2

A.

It was at the same time, yes, sir.

3

Q.

Is that Alan Julian you spoke with; was that your

4

testimony?

5

A.

I believe that was his name, yes, sir.

6

MR. BURNS: Okay.

7

THE COURT: You can step down, Deputy.

8

MS. ALLEN: Let me go get Ms. Turner.

9

THE COURT: Ms. Allen, why —

10
11

All right, thank you.

what would —

for what

purpose would you be calling Ms. Turner?
MS. ALLEN: Your Honor, she can testify to the box.

12

They went and tried to mail this box with pills in it.

13

a sworn preliminary hearing statement that she's -- actually

14

has now, ^which I was going to simply submit to the Court; and

15

then if the Court wanted further clarification I could call

16

her, but I will file that witness statement.

17

I have

THE COURT: Didn't the deputy already testify that that

18

is what he was told by this witness; and I don't believe that

19

was objected to, was it?

20
21

MR. BURNS: It wasn't, but it's because I knew the
witness was here.

22

THE COURT: Okay.

23

MR. BURNS: But no, your Honor, it wasn't.

24

MS. ALLEN: Let me -- I can just get -- the witness

25

All right.

statement actually speaks to it.
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2

THE COURT: What would you like to do, Mr . Burns; would
you like to hear from the witness?

3

MR. BURNS: Actually, may I approach?

4

THE COURT: You may.

5

(Discussion at the bench off the record)

6

THE COURT: Do you rest, Ms. Allen?

7

MS. ALLEN: I do, your Honor.

8

THE COURT: Any evidence from the defense today,

9

Mr. Burns?

10

MR. BURNS: No, your Honor, we'll submit.

11

THE COURT: All right, no argument?

12

MR. BURNS: No, we will submit.

13

THE COURT: Court finds, then, that there is probable

14

cause to find that Mr. Woodward committed the off*arises with

15

which he is charged, to the sufficient quantum required to bind

16

him over, and therefore orders Mr. Wickward bound over on all

17

four charges contained within the Information in the 382 case.

18

How would you like to handle arraignment , Mrr Burns?

19

MR. BURNS: Your Honor, we'd like to come back and have

20

an arraignment in this matter on August 3rd.

21

THE COURT: All right, arraignment August 3rd at 1:30.

22

MR. BURNS: Thank you.

23

(Hearing concluded)
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SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA AND
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL, and
ORDER
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vs.
LEVI WICKWARD,

Criminal No. 101500382

Defendant.

Judge G. Michael Westfall

I, LEVI WICKWARD, hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been advised of and that
I understand the following facts and rights:
NOTIFICATION OF CHARGES
I am pleading guilty to the following crimes:
Crime & Statutory
Provision

A.

Degree

POSSESSION OF A
2nd Degree Felony
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE
WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE,
UCA 658-37-8

SCANNED

Punishment
Min/Max and/or
Minimum Mandatory
1-15 yrs/ $10,000 fine,
plus a 90% surcharge,
and a $33 court security
fee.

000027

B.

DRIVING WITH
Class B Misdemeanor
MEASURABLE CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCE IN THE BODY,
UCA§41-6a-517

6 months/$1,000 fine,
plus a 90% surcharge,
and a $33 court security
fee.
Initials

I have received a copy of the Information against me. I have read it, or had it read to me, and
I understand the nature and the elements of the crimes to which I am pleading guilty.
Initials
The elements of the crimes to which I am pleading guilty are:
COUNT 1: POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE
WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE, a second degree fe lony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(l)(a)(iii), as follows: That on
or about June 29, 2010, in Iron County, State of Utah, I did
knowingly and intentionally possess a controlled or counterfeit
substance with intent to distribute; to wit: Oxycodone.
COUNT 2: DRIVING WITH MEASURABLE CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCE IN THE BODY, a class B misdemeanor, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. §41 -6a-517, as follows: That on or about June 29,
2010, in Iron County, State of Utah, I did operate or was in actual
physical control of a vehicle, and had any measurable controlled
substance or metabolite of a controlled substance in my body.

C'J

Initials

I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crimes listed
above. I stipulate and agree that the following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other
persons for which I am criminally liable. These facts provide a basis for the court to accept my
guilty pleas and prove the elements of the crimes to which I am pleading guilty:
Initials

000028

I did, on or about June 29, 2010, in Iron County, State of Utah, knowingly and intentionally
possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute; to wit: Oxycodone; and I did
operate or was in actual physical control of a vehicle, and had any measurable controlled substance
or metabolite of a controlled substance in my body.
Initials
WAIVER OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights under the
constitutions of Utah and of the United States. I also understand that if I plead guilty I will give up
all the following rights:
Initials
1. Counsel: I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I cannot
afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I understand that I might
later, if the judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the appointed lawyer's service
to me.
Initials
I have not waived my right to counsel; or if I have waived my right to counsel, I have done
so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, and after stating my reasons for doing so on the record.

LAJ_
Initials
If I have waived my right to counsel, I certify that I have read this statement and that I
understand the nature and elements of the charges and crimes to which I am pleading guilty. I also

nnnn^

understand my rights in this case and other cases and the consequences of my guilty plea.
Initials
If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is Jack B. Burns. My attorney and I
have fully discussed this statement, my rights, and the consequences of my guilty plea.
Initials
2. Jury Trial. I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial
(unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty.
Initials
3. Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know that if I were to have a
trial, a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified against me and b) my
attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have the opportunity to cross-examine
all of the witnesses who testified against me.

CO
Initials
4. Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a trial, I could call witnesses
if I chose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of those
witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the State would pay those costs.
Initials
5. Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination. I know that if I were to have
a trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behalf I also know that if I chose not to testify,
no one could make me testify or make me give evidence against myself. I also know that if I chose
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not to testify, the jury would be told that they could not hold my refusal to testify against me.
Initials
6. Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. I know that if I do not plead guilty (or
no contest), I am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the charged crimes.
If I choose to fight the charges against me, I need only plead "not guilty," and my case will be set for
a trail. At a trial, the State would have the burden of proving each element of the charges beyond
a reasonable doubt. If the trail is before a jury, the verdict must be unanimous, meaning that each
juror would have to find me guilty.
Initials
I understand that if I plead guilty, I give up the presumption of innocence and will be
admitting that I committed the crimes stated above.

uj
Initials
7. Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or judge,
I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the costs of an
appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am giving up my right to appeal
my conviction if I plead guilty. I understand that if I wish to appeal my sentence I must file a notice
of appeal within 30 days after my sentence is entered.
Initials
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all the
statutory and constitutional rights as explained above.
Initials

-5-

000031

8. Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each crime
to which I am pleading guilty. I know that by pleading guilty to a crime that carries a mandatory
penalty, I will be subjecting myself to serving a mandatory penalty for that crime. I know my
sentence may include a prison term, fine, or both.
Initials
I know that in addition to a fine, a ninety percent (90%) surcharge will be imposed. I also
know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victims of my crimes, including any restitution
that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part of a plea agreement.
Initials
9. Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is more than one crime
involved, the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or they may run at the
same time (concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine for each crime that I plead
to. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing on another offense of
which I have been convicted or which I have plead guilty, my guilty plea now may result in
consecutive sentences being imprisoned or on parole, I know the law requires the court to impose
consecutive sentences unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentences
would be inappropriate.
Initials
10. Plea agreement. My guilty plea is the result of a plea agreement between myself and
the prosecuting attorney. All the promises, duties, and provisions of the plea agreement, if any, are
fully contained in this statement, including those explained below:
In exchange for rny plea of "guilty" to the offenses of POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED
t
SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE, a Second-Degree Felony; and DRIVING WITH
-6-
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MEASURABLE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE IN THE BODY, a Class B Misdemeanor; the State
has agreed to dismiss the remaining charges of POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE
WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE, a Class A Misdemeanor; and POSSESSION OF DRUG
PARAPHERNALIA, a Class B Misdemeanor; and dismiss Criminal Case No. 101500414.
Moreover, I understand that the State of Utah will be requesting the preparation of a Presentence
Investigation Report prior to sentencing. I further understand that I will be ordered to pay restitution
in Criminal Case No. 101500414 and I agree to do so. No other promises have been made to induce
me to plead guilty.
Initials
11.

Trial judge not bound.

I know that any charge or sentencing concession or

recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges for
sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not binding on
the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they believe the judge may
do are not binding on the judge.
Initials
DEFENDANT'S CERTIFICATION OF VOLUNTARINESS

I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats, of unlawful
influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty. No promises except those contained
in this statement have been made to me.

uC
Initials
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I understand its
contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to change or delete
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anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes because all of the
statements are correct.
Initials
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney.
Initials
I am ^ - ^ years of age. I have attended school through the I \

grade. I can read and

understand the English language. If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been provided
to me. I was not under the influence of any drugs, mediation, or intoxicants which would impair my
judgment when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently under the influence of any drug,
medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgment.
Initials
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I am free of any mental disease,
defect, or impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I am doing or from
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea.

LP
Initials
I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty plea, I must file a written motion or
withdraw my plea before sentence is announced. I understand that for a plea held in
abeyance, a motion to withdraw from the plea agreement must be made within 30 days of
pleading guilty or no contest. I will only be allowed to withdraw my plea if I show that it was
not knowingly and voluntarily made. I understand that any challenge to my plea made after
sentencing must be pursued under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act in Title 78, Chapter 35a,
and Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
-8-

DATED _ ! ;

day of

V~pU^/x,lv>

2010.

>ityak^7^

o^O iLEVI WICKWARD
Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEY

I certify that I am the attorney for LEVI WICKWARD, the defendant above, and I know he
has read the statement, or that I have read it to him; and I discussed it with him and believe he fully
understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of
my knowledge and belief, after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the crime and the factual
synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated; and these, along with the other
representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are accurate and
true.

'JACK B. BURNS
Attorney for Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY

I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against LEVI WICKWARD,
defendant. I have reviewed this Statement of Defendant and find that the factual basis of the
defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the offense is true and correct. No improper
inducements, threats, or coercions to encourage a plea have been offered defendant. The plea
negotiations are fully contained in the Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as
supplemented on the record before the Court. There is reasonable cause to believe the evidence
-9-
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would support the conviction of defendant for the offense for which the plea is entered and
acceptance of the plea would serve the public interest.

ANN MARIE McIFF ALLEN
Deputy Iron County Attorney

ORDER

Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the
defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representation in the court, the Court witnesses the
signatures and finds that defendant's guilty plea is freely, knowingly, and voluntarily made.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty plea to the crimes set forth in the
Statement be accepted and entered.
DATED this

/

day of

£ep£z~U*^

? 2010.

District Court Judge
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1

P R O C E E D I N ( 3 S

2

(Electronically recorded on October 5, 2010)
THE COURT: Next is the sentencing in State vs. Levi

3
4

Wickward, 101500382

Mr. Burns?

5

MR. BURNS: Yes, your Honor.

6

THE COURT: All right, and I've received and I've read

7

the pre-sentence report.

Have you also done that?

8

MR. BURNS: Yes, your Honor.

9

THE COURT: Okay, are you ready to proceed with the

10

sentencing?

11

MR. BURNS: We are.

12

THE COURT: Who's handling this for the State today?

13

MR. EDWARDS: I am, your Honor.

14

THE COURT: Mr. Edwards, do you have a recommendation

15

for sentencing in the case?

16
17

MR. EDWARDS: Just ask that the Court follow the
recommendations contained within the PSI.

18

THE COURT: Mr. Burns.

19

MR. BURNS: Your Honor, we have -- we have reviewed

20

the PSI.

21

recommendation.

22

the Court to consider.

23

should be given one more opportunity to successfully complete

24

probation.

25

We see -- both my client and I are aware of the
We would recommend an alternate sentence for
Your Honor, we think that Mr. Wickward

We're asking that the Court sentence him to 270 days

~3~
1

in the Iron County Jail, with credit for time served.

2

(inaudible) him the opportunity of probation in this case with

3

standard probationary terms, including a fine.

4

$1,500 fine is appropriate, along with the substance abuse

5

evaluation and recommended treatment,

6

terms that we'd normally see in this type of case if the

7

recommendation were not prison.

8
9

Then

We do think a

Again, the standard

Mr. Wickward understands -- first, he has a relationship with the probation officer who authored this PSI .

He

10

knows him.

He understands -- he understands the recommendation

11

and why he made the recommendation; but does believe that there

12

is some more background that he'd like the Court to consider.

13

That background -- and I will let him speak to that.

14

He is more familiar and closer to it than I am; but in the

15

case that he's currently on probation for, in which this

16

would propose an order to show cause, he feels like he has

17

progressively done better, and he is a better person today

18

than when he was first placed on probation.

19

substantial progress in probation in that case.

20

speak more toward that, your Honor.

That he "made
I'll let him

21

THE COURT: Mr. Wickward.

22

MR. WICKWARD: Your Honor, yes, I have lived a very

23

rough and unsettled life, being from childhood I was placed

24

in a home where my parents were drug addicts.

25

additions with alcohol, marijuana, methamphetamines, all those

I have

fought

-41

things; and your Honor, I admit, you know, for 16 years or

2

longer I've done those drugs, and then I quit on my own accord,

3

being a father.

4

There's a lot of things in my life that I want to

5

progress past and get out of that revolving door, so to speak.

6

I want to do a better job and pay back, you know, more towards

7

the community, along with my children, as well.

8

want to prove myself to myself, to my family, to you, your

9

Honor.

10

You know, I

I just -- excuse me for being nervous and trying to

11

speak this clearly, but there's a lot of things in my life that

12

I have lived through.

13

know, there's things that I just want to get past behind me and

14

do a better job for my children.

15

be a State -- you know, a burden to the State.

16

be my responsibility in full.

17

I have gone through and ultimately, you

I don't want my children to
I want them to

My daughter was viciously attacked in April by a pit

18

bull in Hurricane at my neighbor's house, and I just --•I

19

haven't been away from my kids this long ever.

20

of things that have gone really wrong in this last year for me.

21

There's a lot

Prior to being put on probation, I was walking out of

22

a store and I got hit by a vehicle.

I suffered some medical

23

injuries from that.

24

ready to obtain my high school diploma.

25

daughter was injured.

I started going to school, was getting
Prior to that, I -- my

Just I've had a lot of challenges.

-51

In June, the one time I did relapse, I smoked marijuana

2

one time, and I did, you know, admit to that to the probation

3

officers that I would be dirty for it.

4

valid prescription to these medications that I tested positive

5

for, in which the State says that I didn't have, but I do.

6

However, I do have a

I'm sorry, I'm just really nervous and trying to speak

7

this to you clearly; but I just want you to understand that I

8

really do want to get this all put behind me.

I want to finish

,9

with school.

10

youth counselor or advisor, so that I can maybe help children

11

not live the life that I have, or suffer from the things that

12

I have, without being able to speak forward and those kind of

13

things.

14

I want to go to college so that I can become a

There's a lot of -- a lot of children in this world who

15

deserve better chances and help than what I have received as

16

a child.

17

but other people's as well.

18

really nervous about trying to speak my heart to you "right now;

19

but there's a lot of things I wish you could see through in my

20

case and understand where I'm coming from.

21
22
23

So I want to do better not only for my own children,
I'm really sorry, I'm just —

THE COURT: All right, thank you.

I'm

Anything else from

the State?
MR. EDWARDS: Your Honor", I'll just point out for the

24

Court that what the PSI contained, the defendant was being

25

supervised in Washington State, where he had a number of

-61

violations including several dirty UA's.

He absconded from

2

that state.

3

he committed new crimes.

4

the very same day he had a plea agreement on those new crimes.

5

He admitted -- pled guilty to a second-degree felony.

He was on bench probation in Washington City, when
When he committed this offense, on

6

He also attempted to smuggle drugs into the jail and he damaged

7

the jail once he was there.

8

prior convictions, your Honor, I would -- it would be my recom-

9

mendation that he be sentenced to prison in this case.

10

Based on this conduct and his

I think

that would be appropriate.

11

THE COURT: Okay, thank you.

Mr. Burns?

12

MR. BURNS: Your Honor, regarding -- first of all,

13

regarding the statement as to conduct of smuggling drugs into

14

the jail, that matter was charged as a separate charge.

15

not appointed Counsel on that.

16

was present, because these cases were moving forward at the

17

same time.

It was Jeff Slack.

I was

However, I

18

Given -- given the facts of that case, and what Judge

19

Walton indicated was his indication to probably not bind over,

20

the State dismissed that count.

21

appropriately considered.

22

I don't think that that is

As to the damage to jails matter, I do think that's

23

appropriately considered.

Mr. Wickward was in the facility.

24

He was essentially -- well, not essentially.

25

act.

There was a lewd

He Was flashed by another inmate, and he kicked -- there

-71

was a door with a window.

2

between he and the inmate.

3

his intent to break the window.

4

an attention gaining activity for the person on the other side.

5

The window is on the bottom pane
He kicked the window.

It was not

Rather, it was -- I guess like

MR. WICKWARD: I was walking away from the door, your

6

Honor.

I just kind of tapped it with my foot^as I was walking

7

away.

8

It was a mere accident, and I admitted to the officer in the

9

bubble at the time that I had done that.

I didn't try to kick it like I was going through it.

10

THE COURT: So you didn't break it?

11

MR. WICKWARD: No, I broke it, but

12

THE COURT: Oh, by tapping it?

13

MR. WICKWARD: By kicking it with my foot as I was

14

walking away, and I admitted it to the officer, who didn't

15

catch it.

16

this window, and I admitted it to the sergeant at the jail,

17

the Iron County disciplinary hearing officer; and they charged

18

me $38.36 for the window, being honest about it.

19

it wasn't out of an act or anger or anything like that.

20

—

You know, I had to go tell him that I had broke

So, 1 mean,

I have completed drug treatment this last year.

I've

21

completed anger management, life skills.

22

for my high school diploma so that I can further, you know, go

23

into college to do better for myself.

24
25

I'm going to school

Tjie one thing I did, you know, I just -- I got kind
of bound up in June, and messed up by relapsing one time m

my

-8year of being on probation.

I had full --

MR. BURNS: As to the damage to the jail, that is a
specific intent crime.

We -- rather than proceed with that,

it was wrapped up into this plea agreement and dismissed.

The

PSI speaks to restitution and $38,36, and that not being able
to be governed by this case.
Mr. Wickward would stipulate to the restitution being
ordered in this case, your Honor.

We do think that that is

appropriate.
THE COURT: Okay, just a moment.
MR. WICKWARD: One more thing.

Being on probation in

the State of Washington, I had moved down here to try and find
a home with my new family.

My fiancee is from St. George ; and

I had told my probation officer in Washington State that I had
done this.
The reason why they're charging me with an absco nding
is because I just haven't been able to pay all my full -- in
fines.

That was it.

I completed everything they wanted me to

in the State of Washington, and then moved down here, rep orted
my address.
They put a warrant out for me.

I turned myself in on

that warrant; and just because I haven't been able to pay the
fines in full -- I take care of four children, your Honor , and
being thisi last year not being able to work due to my accident,
it's just been rough.

I really do want to prove myself, not

-9only to myself, but to the communi ty and tc everybody else
involved.

My children need me.
THE COURT: State want to be heard any further with

regard to this?
MR. EDWARDS: Well, I don' t know.

I just think it's

surprising that there's an excuse for everything, but there are
a number of past convictions.
THE COURT: Right.
MR. EDWARDS: I —

although there atppears to be an

excuse for every single action, I still think he deserves to
be sentenced to prison.
THE COURT: Well, and the difficult y is that the PSI
indicates that he's not been successfully - - successful on
probation in the past.
MR. EDWARDS: Yes.
THE COURT: Have you successfully c ompleted any
probation?
MR. WICKWARD: Your Honor, I haven't had an oppertuni ty
to successfully complete, no.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. WICKWARD: I've just - - I've been trying.

I was

really close to getting everything done for this probation
in Washington County, and I caught this charge for having a
prescription of my own medications without the bottles.
-- I really -

I just

-10THE COURT: Well, the charge was possession with intent

1
2

to distribute.

3

MR. WICKWARD: Yeah, I understand that.

4

THE COURT: That's what you pled guilty to.

5

MR. WICKWARD: Yeah, I -- there was no way around it,

6

I suppose.
THE COURT: All right.

7

All right, Mr. Levi Wickward,

8

pursuant to your conviction of the crime of possession of a

9

controlled substance with intent to distribute, a second-degree

10

felony, the Court sentences you to serve 1 to 15 years in the

11

Utah State Prison and orders you to pay a $1,000 fine.

12

includes the 90 percent surcharge, plus a $33 Court security

13

fee.

14

That

Pursuant to your conviction of trying to d]rive with

15

a measurable controlled substance in your body, a Class B

16

misdemeanor, the Court sentences you to serve six months

17

incarceration, no fine, and orders you to pay a $33 Court

18

security fee.

19

currently with Count I.

20

That sentence is ordered to e served cbn-

I'm not going to place you on probation; I' m concerned

21

about your history.

You're remanded to the custody of the Iron

22

County Sheriff for transport to the Utah State Prison to serve

23

that sentence.

24

you can appeal; and you do that by filing a written notice of

25

appeal to the Court within 30 days.

If you think I've made a mistake in this case,

-111

The order should include a recommendation that the

2

defendant be given credit for the -- according to the report,

3

the 99 days that he's been incarcerated, waiting for resolution

4

in this matter.

5

That's all on your case today, Mr. Wickward.

MR. WICKWARD: Your Honor, there's one thing.

My cell

6

phone is being held as evidence.

7

contact information and everything I have not been able to

8

get.

9

information for my family and friends before I am shipped to

10
11
12
13

It's got all, my family's

If there's a way I could get, you know, just my contact

prison, your Honor.
THE COURT: Well, I don't -- I don't know what you want
to do with regard to that.

The --

MR. BURNS: Your Honor, if he can just go on record

14

right now authorizing the release of that evidence to me after

15

the 30 days have expired --

16

THE COURT: All right, because you have 30 days to file

17

an appeal.

If you file an appeal within that time frame, then

18

obviously we need to make sure that we rec -- we keep evidence

19

available in case that the Appellate Court determines that I've

20

made a mistake and you get a new -- and I'm reversed on appeal

21

and you get a new trial.

22

State may -- maybe there's -- I don't know why you would want

23

to keep the evidence, but --

Once that 30 days is expired, the

24

I^R. EDWARDS: I don't know why, either.

25

MR. BURNS: Your Honor, there is a procedure we can

-12follow to have that released.
THE COURT: Right, okay.
MR. BURNS: I just want Mr. Edwards to hear me get
authorization from my client for that.

I also have a written

authorization right here.
MR. WICKWARD: Yeah, and I do give authorization.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. BURNS: Thank you.
(Hearing concluded)
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IRON COUN,
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

)

JUDGMENT, SENTENCE,
AND COMMITMENT

)

Criminal No. 101500382

)

Judge G. Michael Westfall

Plaintiff,
vs.
LEVI WICKWARD,
Defendant.

The Defendant, LEVI WICKWARD, having entered a plea of guilty to the offenses of
POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE, a SecondDegree Felony; and DRIVING WITH MEASURABLE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE IN THE
BODY, a Class B Misdemeanor; on September 1, 2010, and the Court having accepted said plea of
guilty and thereafter having ordered the preparation of a Presentence Investigation Report, and after
said report was prepared and presented to the Court, the above-entitled matter having come on for
sentencing on October 5,2010, in Cedar City, Utah, and the Defendant, LEVI WICKWARD, having
appeared in person, together with his attorney of record Jack B. Burns, and the State of Utah having
appeared by and through\Deputy Iron County Attorney G. Michael Edwards, and the Court having
reviewed the Presentence Investigation Report and the file in detail, and thereafter having heard

SCANNED
nnnnsc

statements from all parties, and the Court being fully advised in the premises now makes and enters
the following Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment as follows:
JUDGMENT
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendant, LEVI
WICKWARD, and pursuant to his plea of guilty, has been convicted of the offenses of
POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE, a SecondDegree Felony; and DRIVING WITH MEASURABLE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE IN THE
BODY, a Class B Misdemeanor; and the Court having asked whether the Defendant had anything
to say in regard to why judgment should not be pronounced, and no sufficient cause to the contrary
being shown or appearing to the Court, it is adjudged that the Defendant is guilty as charged and
convicted.
SENTENCE
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant, LEVI WICKWARD, and pursuant to his
conviction of POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO
DISTRIBUTE, a Second-Degree Felony, shall serve a term of imprisonment for a period of one (1)
to fifteen (15) years in the Utah State Prison, and the Defendant is hereby placed in the custody of
the Utah Department of Corrections.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant, LEVI WICKWARD, and pursuant to his
conviction of POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO
DISTRIBUTE, a Second-Degree Felony, shall pay a fine in the sum and amount of one thousand
dollars ($ 1,000), including a ninety percent (90%) surcharge, and a court security fee in the sum and
amount of thirty-three dollars ($33).

-2-

000057

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant, LEVI WICKWARD, and pursuant to his
conviction of DRIVING WITH MEASURABLE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE IN THE BODY,
a Class B Misdemeanor, shall serve a term of imprisonment for a period not to exceed six (6) months
in the Utah State Prison, and the Defendant is hereby placed in the custody of the Utah Department
of Corrections.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant, LEVI WICKWARD, and pursuant to his
conviction of DRIVING WITH MEASURABLE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE IN THE BODY,
a Class B Misdemeanor, shall pay a court security fee in the sum and amount of thirty-three dollars
($33).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the sentences imposed herein shall be served concurrently.
IT IS ALSO RECOMMENDED that the Defendant receive credit for ninety-nine (99) days
served in the Iron County Jail.
COMMITMENT
TO THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS:
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to take the Defendant, LEVI WICKWARD, and
deliver him to the Utah State Prison in Draper, Utah, there to be kept and confined in accordance
with the above and foregoing Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment.
DATED this

tfC~

day of October, 2010.
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Criminal No. 101500382, now on file and of record in my office.
WITNESS my hand and the seal of said office in Cedar City, County of Iron, State of Utah,
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day of October, 2010.
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Attorney for Defendant
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